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Introduction: Britain and South Africa in silicosis politics
Defining a disease as occupation-related, as Dembe [1996] has argued, is subject to a wide range of social, economic, political and cultural factors. Historians Rosner and Markowitz [1994] and Bufton and Melling [2005a] have shown how the politics of silicosis was complex, with a plethora of individuals and groups participating in the campaigns to attain recognition of it as an occupational disease and enforce preventative measures, regulation and extend compensation schemes.
In mining, recent research [Lyddon, 2014; McIvor and Johnston 2007; Bloor, 2000] has emphasised the pivotal role played by the miners' trade unions and the way they effectively marshalled their own alternative 'lay' epidemiology and challenged medical orthodoxies.
Within these debates and campaigns examples of 'best practice'
elsewhere outside the United Kingdom (UK) played a part, not least in enabling the case to be made that unhealthy work processes had been identified through extensive and rigorous epidemiology, and that diseases like silicosis were capable of being tackled by rigorous state intervention without significantly undermining the competitiveness of an industry. This was the case with South Africa and the regulation of silicosis from the 1910s, which was held up as an exemplar in North America [Derickson, 1988, p. 86] and Britain. Hence, one British delegate to the International Labour Office Conference on silicosis in Johannesburg in 1930 (pulmonary disease specialist Professor Arthur
Hall) described South Africa as 'the mecca for silicosis researchers' in
The Lancet [Hall, 1930] . Similarly silicosis pathologist Professor E.H.
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Kettle commented after the conference in the British Medical Journal:
'the experience of South African workers [meaning medical researchers] was so great that considerable weight must be given to their views' [Kettle, 1930, p. 780] . Four years after the conference Chief Medical Inspector of Factories Sydney W. Fisher referred to the seminal contribution of research in South Africa and in the ensuing discussion a commentator (William Cullen) referred to the pioneering of radiography on the Rand: 'where collectively there has been more done than at any other centre in the world' [Fisher, 1934-5, p. 23 Trade unionists and sympathetic Labour Party politicians also used the South African example in an attempt to cajole and shame the British government into action to extend the restrictive silicosis compensation scheme (introduced in 1918) to make it more inclusive, notably in relation to coal miners. Frequent references were made, for example, to the pioneering use of dust suppression methods in South Africa by mining trade union officials [Davies, undated, p. 6] Grenfell: Whether, in view of the prevalence of miners' phthisis in the coal-mining industry, he will consider the compulsory adoption of wet drilling-machines for boring in all operations for blasting and removal of stone in coal mines.
Brown: The application of a general measure of the kind proposed to drilling in all kinds of stone would not appear … to be an appropriate remedial measure.
Grenfell: In view of the enormous number of disablement cases reported at the present time, does not the honorable gentleman believe that it is the duty of his Department to provide means by which these cases can be avoided?
Brown: The answer is that my first duty is to ascertain the facts… the honourable member will see that it is not possible to take the line that he suggests.
Grenfell: Is it not the duty of the Department to follow in this case the example of South Africa, where death and disablement from miners' phthisis have been wiped out?
Brown: It would be unwise to draw a comparison without full knowledge in both cases.
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Grenfell: Is not the knowledge fully within the possession of the Department now? The knowledge is available to us, and the Department should have it.
Brown: There is a vast amount of knowledge, but it leads to varying conclusions on the part of men who are experts from various points of view.
Grenfell: Is it not the case that in South Africa miners' lives have been saved, while in this country lives are being lost in large numbers?
Brown: I could not admit that [Hansard, 1934] . This conversation is revealing at a number of levels. What might be highlighted is the way that the government in power denied the extent of the problem, cast doubt on scientific or technical solutions and could allude to a lack of consensus and of contested medical evidence and opinion as a riposte to the (albeit exaggerated) claims that another nation (i.e. South Africa) had conquered the scourge of silicosis. Similar references to South Africa as the exemplar of 'best practice' on silicosis continued to crop up to the 1950s [Minister of Pensions and National Insurance, 1955, p. 105; Trades Union Congress, 1958, p. 244 
Forging international links and deepening awareness
The links between South Africa and Britain in relation to workplace health and safety in mining were evident long before the 1930 Johannesburg conference, as was the existence of a serious respiratory disability problem in British mines. In the early twentieth century, however, this was almost universally considered to be an issue affecting metal miners and not the far more numerous coal miners [Bufton and Melling, 2005a; Mills, 2010; Morrison, 2010] . John S.
Haldane's pioneering research in 1900-02 identified high levels of silicosis amongst the Cornish tin miners in South West England. These miners frequently migrated to work in South Africa's gold mines and remigrated back home when disabled to be cared for by family, or, in the last resort ended up in the workhouse [Derickson, 1988, pp. 77-78 ].
Haldane's work implicated dusty conditions abroad in South Africa as well as in Cornwall where miners worked with machine drills with little or no protection. Of 142 'lifetime' machine drill miners who died in one area in Cornwall (Redruth), 133 died of respiratory diseases, with the average age of death just 37 years. Non-machine miners lived on average 16 years longer to 53 years [Shufflebotham, 1914; Louis, 1902; Haldane, et al., 1904] .
This was not the only deleterious connection with the 'unhygienic' and unhealthy mines in South Africa. Cornish tin miners also brought back intestinal worms which led to serious outbreaks of anklyostomiasis before First World War. This fuelled anxieties about in-migration of germs in workers' bodies that later extended to serious concerns about 8 the spread of tuberculosis (TB) in British mines by migrant workers, for example from Poland (to Scotland) and Eastern Europe [Oliver, 1925, p. 530; Burke, 1985] [Shufflebotham, 1914, 589] . The South African government were aware of Haldane and Oliver's findings and that (together, as Rosental [2015] has argued, with growing 'political and media pressure' from the UK) triggered the first Transvaal silicosis enquiry and, from there, the first worldwide official recognition of silicosis for compensation in South Africa in 1912. This first study of the white 'European' gold miners in South Africa found 31.6% of underground miners examined to have 'miners' phthisis' and almost half (47.5%) of all machine drillers had the disease. It was estimated that 90% of the underground workforce would 'eventually' contract the disease and that TB rates amongst those with silicosis were three times higher than those who were healthy [Shufflebotham, 1914, p. 589] . [Fisher, 1935] . Indeed the accumulating evidence around a cluster of health issues, including the miners' eye disease nystagmus, 'beat' hand, knee and elbow Collis (1870 Collis ( -1957 , but this recommendation was rejected by the British government in favour of its own civil servants and government committee members [Rosental, 2015] . Collis was amongst the best known of UK medical specialists on silicosis at the time, and was amongst those who were sceptical about the prevailing idea (supported by John S. Haldane) that coal dust was innocuous in miners' respiratory disease [Collis, 1919; Collis and Gilchrist, 1928] . Collis also had radical ideas about what he called 'the reclamation of the disabled' [Collis and Greenwood, 1921] . His absence was significant.
The 'core' knowledge being discussed at the 1930 Johannesburg Conference was that of the 20 years or so of experience in the South African gold mines with silicosis and the epidemiology, regulatory and 13 compensation responses. However, the considerable knowledge of silicosis research in the UK (and elsewhere) was also fed into the discussions and had an impact on the outcomes. The contributions of the British delegates are revealing as they exhibited a conservative and bureaucratic approach, reflecting the prevailing 'scientism' of the day.
The notion that dominated was that something had to be proven, verified and irrefutably corroborated with epidemiological evidence before any remedial action could be taken. Probabilities based on actual lay evidence and experience within mining communities stood for little. The 1930 conference thus probably did little to affect the practical politics of the struggle to get silicosis properly recognised as an issue in mining in the UK in the 1930s. However, it does tell us a lot about prevailing discourses, beliefs and contested medical knowledge, whilst the exchange of information at the scientific and epidemiological level and the publicity the conference generated undoubtedly had some effect in raising the profile of the disease in the UK.
Amongst the points British delegate Edward L. Middleton made in his opening remarks to the conference was that serious disability and death could come after very short exposures to dust inhalation at work. One example he gave was of a silicotic with only two and half years' work experience in a dusty trade [ILO, 1930, pp. 26-27] . He declared he was not able to definitively determine a standard of air dustiness that was dangerous and welcomed discussion on this (significantly there was no recommended standard of airborne dustiness adopted at the conference). On two points he appears to have embraced prevailing 14 medical orthodoxies: Firstly, that other dusts (e.g., coal/carbon) acted as 'restraining agents' or 'antidotes' to silicosis and tuberculosis (following J.S. Haldane) and, secondly, that tuberculosis was the critical issue, postulating that 'silicosis was not developed in a healthy lung'.
The idea that inhaling coal dust had any prophylactic effect was immediately rejected by Dr Bohme, based on research amongst miners in Germany [ILO, 1930, pp. 38-39] . The final conference resolution on this firmly rejected Haldane's theory of coal dust as an 'antidote' to tuberculosis, whilst calling for further investigative research [ILO, 1930, p. 95] . The conference defined silicosis clearly as a distinct occupational disease (and not as a type of TB) with discrete stages and a synergistic relationship to TB. As Rosental [2015] has noted, this was a major step forward and a key contribution of the 1930 Johannesburg conference.
Middleton's submitted written report on Britain also underlines his conservatism. This was extensive at 96 pages [ILO, 1930, pp. 384-480] but of this, only eight pages dealt with mining. Middleton embraced the existing orthodoxy in emphasising that silicosis was prevalent in certain factories and in metal mining, but that where a respiratory health risk existed in coal mining it was only in specific operations involving working with silica-rich rock as distinct from an exposure risk across the entire underground mining labour force. Middleton's paper identified the risks inherent in dry rock drilling and narrowly defined those exposed to risk in the 'processes' of ripping, blasting of roof, driving through rock 15 and drifts [ILO, 1930, p. 427] . This conservative strategy of containment was evident when he commented:
Certain workers employed below ground in coal mines contract a disabling and even fatal fibrosis of the lungs… These cases, although at first sight they seem so varied, when reduced to main factors show that all the men worked for a certain time in rock [ILO, 1930, p. 429] .
He continued with a cautionary note: 'It is impossible as yet to arrive at the true incidence of silicosis in the coalfields'. responded that 'the incidence of silicosis… on natives was relatively low' and 'it could be assumed that intermittent employment gave considerable protection' [ILO, 1930, p.78] . A Medical Officer of the Rand Mutual Insurance Company (Dr Andrew Watt) added that: 'the natives do not breathe through their mouths and, therefore, were protected by a better filter than Europeans' [ILO, 1930, p. 78] .
Contradicting this, the expert on the aetiology of silicosis in African mines (Mavrogordato) had made the point earlier in the conference that 'natives who were employed continuously developed silicosis more rapidly than Europeans' [ILO, 1930, p. 45] . As Ehrlich has shown, racialization in workmen's compensation law in South African mining persisted until almost the end of the twentieth century [Ehrlich, 2012] .
After 1930, silicosis certifications rocketed massively in the UK amongst coal mining workers, notably in South Wales [Bufton and Melling, 2005a; 2005b] . Within a few years, moreover, it was recognised that apart from classic silicosis, coal miners were also suffering from a fibrosis of the lungs connected solely to inhaling coal dust. In an echo of the dust would equate, one delegate (Du Toit) argued, to 'slow suicide' [ILO, 1930, p. 82] . Others saw dismissal as justified on the grounds that the TB cross-infection risk had to be minimised. On the other hand were arguments that in the interwar Depression there were few alternative job opportunities for miners, especially older men, so unemployment and the deleterious physical and mental impacts of loss of work and income worsened their situation. Work could be bad for you, but unemployment was undeniably worse for health and well-being before the era of the Welfare State. Fisher made this point in relation to British coalfields, where unemployment levels were unprecedentedly high during the Depression [ILO, 1930, p. 83] . The 1930 conference decided on a compromise recommendation on this which supported dismissal where any TB was detected and with just silicosis (without TB) a policy where sackings of younger, less experienced workers was encouraged, with some flexibility to retain older workers -over 45 -in employment [ILO, 1930, p. 101] . The opportunity to declare an obligation upon industry based on social responsibility to provide alternative employment in dust-free occupations or full pensions was passed by, despite an Australian delegate (W.E. George) to the 1930 conference commenting that this was the prevailing policy in the mining community in Broken Hill where he was a medical officer [ILO, 1930, p. 83] .
The increased medical surveillance upon workers which went along with the emerging silicosis compensation schemes in South Africa, Britain and elsewhere meant that workers' bodies were now under unprecedented levels of scrutiny. The importance of pre-emptive 20 medical selection of the fittest workers was validated at the 1930 conference which adopted the resolution:
The physique of the worker is a factor of primary importance.
An initial medical examination to ensure a certain standard of physique should be generally adopted in those industries in which the risk of exposure to silica dust is great. Periodic medical examination of such workers is also essential [ILO, 1930, p. 101 ].
This was both intrusive and facilitated mine owners' efforts to maximise their output by cherry-picking the strongest workers and those least liable to be a compensation burden. Cost-cutting, profit-oriented efficiency lay behind this identification through medical examinations of the fittest and the weeding out of physically weaker workers as well as the disabled silicotics. The 1930 conference also picked up on the fact that there was much uncertainty and contestation over the impact that further dust exposure in employment could have on the progression of the disease [ILO, 1930, pp. 100-101] . There was also recognition at the conference that re-employment and rehabilitation schemes were uneven across industry and had been largely 'unsuccessful'. What characterised this experience was a transition invariably from skilled to unskilled and more insecure, worse paid and less intrinsically rewarding work [Fletcher, 1948 [Fletcher, , pp. 1066 [Fletcher, -1067 . There is no evidence, 
